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Critique of Contingent Valuation and Travel Cost
Methods for Valuing Natural Resources and
Ecosystems
W. David Eberle
and
F. Gregory Hayden
In July 1989 the U.S. District Court ofAppeals in Washington, D.C.
disallowed the method that had been established by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Interior (DOl) for determining what a corporation would pay
in the case of injury to an ecosystem from hazardous waste spills [Ohio
v. Interior 1989]. The DOl method was based on neoclassical method-
ology and appraisal techniques. The Court ruled that "restoration is the
proper remedy for injury to property where measurement of damages
by some other method will fail to compensate fully for the injury," and
that "natural resources have value that is not readily measured by tradi-
tional means" [Ohio v. Interior 1989, pp. 456-57]. One traditional
means that the courts found would not compensate fully for injury is
the utilization of market prices. As the court stated, "it is unreasonable
to view market price as the exclusive factor, or even the predominant
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one. From the bald eagle to the blue whale and snail darter, natural 
resources have values that are not fully captured by the market system" 
[Ohio v. Interior 19891. Thus "DO1 erred by establishing 'a strong pre- 
sumption in favor of market price and appraisal methodologies' 51 
Fed. Reg. 27, 720 (1986)" [Ohio v. Interior 19891. While ruling against 
the dependence on market means for measuring injury from hazardous 
spills, the Court did not explicitly rule on the contingent valuation 
method (CVM) and the travel cost method (TCM) as appraisal meth- 
odologies for the valuation of natural resources and ecosystems. These 
methodologies, both of which are based on neoclassical ideology, at- 
tempt to place a market valuation on the natural environment that is 
not included in market exchange. 
The purpose of this article is to critique CVM and TCM in order to 
assist courts and legislative bodies in future deliberations. It is divided 
into three sections. The first is to critique the CV and TC methods in 
the context of the neoclassical paradigm. This section also demon- 
strates that CV and TC methods reach to the same conceptual base as 
that used to legitimize market prices. The second section applies psy- 
chometric standards to evaluate the CV method because the CV ap- 
proach employs surveys to determine the market price of nonmarket 
ecological components. The final task, contained in the third section, 
is to apply the principles of general systems analysis (GSA) to the CVM 
and TCM. Using GSA is consistent with the understanding that eco- 
systems are systems that conform to system principles. The GSA prin- 
ciples contained herein are consistent with institutional methodology. 
CVM and TCM Critiqued With Neoclassical Principles 
Several market type methodologies have been designed by 
neoclassicalists to value non-market goods. These methodologies have 
a common foundation. The fundamental assumption is that the value 
of all goods can be expressed in money equivalent terms and that value 
is based on a good's utility to humans. If humans do not determine a 
use or exchange value for a good, then its existence is inconsequential. 
This assumes that all goods are created to serve man. This distinction 
becomes critical in valuing the natural environment. Once the over- 
arching assumption is made that the basis for valuation is for humans, 
a number of assumptions follow for neoclassicalists. Many of the as- 
sumptions will be discussed below. Three basic ones are: that utility 
functions exist; that a utility function exists that can value non-market 
goods in rank order; and that these value rankings of non-market goods 
can be empirically identified by the TC and CV methods. 
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Contingent valuation is defined as "any approach to valuation of a
commodity which relies upon individual responses to contingent cir-
cumstances posited in an artificially structured market" [Seller, Stoll,
and Chavas 1985, p. 158]. Typically, this valuation methodology is
used in situations where exchange value cannot be established through
a market process. Thus, there is no price associated with these goods.
The CVM utilizes a direct questionnaire approach to solicit
individuals-responses that purport to reflect each individual's valua-
tion of a non-market good. The questionnaire attempts to simulate a
hypothetical market for the good in question where the respondent in-
dicates either willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA)
compensation for the non-market good [Bishop and Heverlein 1979,
p.926].
There are three primary issues surrounding this technique that create
potential problems. The first is the operationalization of a utility func-
tion for estimating value. The second issue is the hypothetical nature
ofsoliciting value rankings. The third issue is the question ofvalidating
the resulting data. The validation issue is one of determining if the
questionnaire measures what it purports to measure. Richard Bishop
and Thomas Heverlein reviewed the preliminary empirical results of
their goose permit study and suggested, "when summed together these
potential problems are sufficient to justify considerable skepticism
about the accuracy of the resulting values estimates" [Bishop and
Heberlein 1979, p. 926]. These sentiments are also reflected by Chris-
tine Seller, John R. Stoll, and Jean-Paul Chavas in their recreational
boating study. They concluded that the CVM had problems with pro-
ducing nonnegative demand curves and negative consumer surplus
[Seller, Stoll, and Chavas 1985, pp. 172 and 75]. In other words, the
contingent valuation responses to their open format questionnaire im-
plied the respondents were willing to pay less for ramp fees than they
actually spend during the recreational season.
The TCM attempts to estimate demand functions for non-market
goods based on the notion of indirect costs. The method has been ex-
tensively used in the valuation of recreational sites [Seller, Stoll, and
Chavas, 1985, p. 157]. The demand functions are estimated by using
travel costs as a surrogate for value. In defining indirect costs, several
significant assumptions are made. First, it must be determined what
are substitutable sites or activities. Second, a decision has to be made
on an appropriate value of time to travel to the site. Third, decisions
have to be made on how to allocate the value of a site between its am-
bience and its various other activities. There are also a number ofdata
requirement problems related to this approach. The editors ofthe book
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Valuing Environmental Goods conclude that the problems in specifica-
tion and data collection with the TCM "result in the dispelling ofwhat
was once regarded as the TCM's greatest potential strength: appealing
to the notion that visitor values must equal or exceed travel costs"
[Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze 1986, p. 95]. It appears that the
outcomes of the TCM are a function of the assumptions made.
Measurement models are designed to reflect a theoretical construct.
Before measurement techniques such as CVM and TCM can be under-
stood, the theoretical construct they purport to measure must be under-
stood. In other words, what does a regression with these variables
actually measure? What are the demand functions that economists
claim drive the market system? Do they exist for non-market goods as
well? These questions will be addressed below in discussions regarding
consumer preference.
The hedonic price method (HPM) is not being covered in this article.
However, since it is referred to later in discussions regarding the testing
of CVM, it will be briefly defined at this time. HPM was introduced to
split a good into its various attributes for the purpose of assigning val-
ues to particular attributes. Operationally in HPM, the commodity's
market price is generally regressed against attributes in order to assign
values to attributes. For example, a house has an overall function of
shelter, but each house also has numerous attributes such as size, num-
ber of rooms, location, style, lot size, neighborhood, and so forth. "Es-
timation problems abound in efforts to implement the HPM-to name
but two: persistent collinearity between 'important' variables and ex-
traordinarily low explanatory power in regression equations" [Cum-
mings, Brookshire, and Schulze 1986, p. 96].
Consumer Preference Theory
The concept that individuals rank commodities derives from con-
sumer preference theory. There are two specifications of the demand
functions in valuing non-market goods. However, in discussions about
the validity of estimating a price for non-market goods, there is rarely
any mention of the appropriateness of using either Hicksian or Mar-
shallian demand functions as the theoretical foundation for what the
TCM or CVM purport to measure. Rather, the discussion of CVM in
the literature surrounds the psychometric issues of demand artifacts,
internal validity, and self-generating constructs [Heberlein 1979; Seller,
Stoll, and Chavas 1985; Thayer 1981]. The TCM struggles with speci-
fying the model, given the data limitations, so that it remains consistent
with theory [Desvousges, Smith, and McGivney 1983]. Thus, a com-
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parison of CVM to HPM cannot provide evidence of the validity or
accuracy vis-a-vis "true" value of CVM as a means of valuing public
goods [Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze 1986, p. 96].
The microfoundation of market demand is the theoretical construct
ofconsumer preference. This construct is often referred to as consumer
demand functions or "utility" functions. The utility construct develops
axioms that represent how consumers value rank commodities in a
market system. Confronted with a set ofmarket prices and correspond-
ing goods, the consumer can establish ex ante a ranking of preference
for these goods based on the relative satisfaction the goods will yield
to him. This ranking is known as the indifference map. Understanding
the nature of how an individual establishes this ranking requires a re-
view ofthe axioms underlying the decision. The axioms direct that con-
sumer behavior is determined by logical necessity and not by the study
of human behavior.
Neoclassical economics is highly axiomatic in that it describes be-
havior as conforming to classical mathematical logic. Without this con-
formity, neoclassical economic modeling falls apart. Thus, a series of
axioms are assumed about how consumers rank their preferences. The
basic assumptions, which are relaxed in more advanced analysis, illus-
trate the point that the assumed human behavior in the theory of the
consumer is a highly artificial one. The axioms are as follows:
1. Completeness: For all x, y in X either x ~ Y or y ~ x or both. This
provides a complete ordering of preferences so that cycling of prefer-
ences does not occur. This axiom implies that two bundles can be com-
pared.
2. Reflexivity: For all x in X, x ~ x. Trivial.
3. Transitivity: For all x, y, and z in X, if x ~ y, y ~ z, then x ~ z. This
axiom is required if preference is to be maximized.
4. Continuity: For all y in X {x: x ~ y} and {x: x ~ y} are closed sets.
It foll?ws t~at ~~: x> y} and {x: x < y} are open sets. This axiom rules
out dlscontlOUltles.
5. Strong Monotonicity: If x ~ y and x 4= y then x > Y. This axiom
simply states that more is preferred to less.
6. Strict Convexity: Given x 4= y and z in X, if x ~ z and y ~ z, then tx
+ (1 - t)y ~ z for all 0 < t < 1. This axiom is the generalization ofdimin-
ishing marginal return [Varian 1984, pp. 112-13].
These axioms purport to define consumer preference. From this set
of axioms the familiar definition of utility functions emerges, with the
characteristics of convex indifference curves and a single preference
maximization, given a budget constraint. From the utility function the
demand function is specified. If the notion of consumer preference as
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defined in the neoclassical model is to be accepted, all the axioms must
also be accepted. These axioms are necessary and sufficient for demand
functions to exist. Ifone ofthese axioms does not hold, then the notion
of consumer preference cannot be determined. For example, the con-
tinuity axiom is necessary to rule out certain discontinuous behavior.
In other words, in the ranking of bundles of goods, if bundles are
merged into new sets, the strict ordering of the original set must be pre-
served. If offering goods to the consumer in different combinations
causes the individual to reorder his preference, as often occurs through
marketing, the axiomatic logic fails and no longer can optimal solutions
be derived. Consumers must behave in a "rational" manner. "Ra-
tional" behavior is defined by the axioms. It is possible to construct
reasonable scenarios where each axiom may be violated in practice by
consumers making decisions to purchase. As Hal R. Varian summa-
rizes, "A utility function is often a very convenient way to describe pref-
erences, but it should not be given a psychological interpretation"
[Varian 1984, p. 112]. "It goes without saying that the axiomatic-
deductive method has been in disrepute in recent decades, in all disci-
plines but mathematics and formal logic-and even here the axioms
are often supposed to be a mere convention rather than necessary
truth" [Rothbard 1979, p. 20].
Proponents ofthis logical approach to model building argue that the
model may be valid even if the assumptions are not. If the model ap-
proximates behavior, it is a legitimate tool ofempirical analysis. [Fried-
man 1953, p. 15]. However, consumer preference theory and the
resulting demand curves also have significant deficiencies in explaining
or predicting behavior.
Alfred Marshall, and later John Hicks, made the first real efforts to
empirically measure demand curves. Marshall approached the problem
by specifying a demand function x(p,y) where demand is a function of
price and income. This is a cardinal demand function where, in real
terms, the consumer is able not only to value rank, but also to perceive
the magnitude of value ordering. This implies that the demand func-
tion should be operational. In other words, consumer utility is meas-
urable in money. It should then be possible to aggregate utility.
However, there are two partial derivatives to this function: the price
differential and the income differential. For the expenditure minimiza-
tion problem to be empirically identified, the function must be separa-
ble, thus implying that price and income are independent ofeach other.
Therefore, the cross partials are zero. The separability requirement also
implies that it is separable only up to a monotonic transformation. This
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severely restricts the form the demand function may take. Human be-
havior is being constrained by mathematical requirements. The limita-
tions and specification problems of this approach are such that
"cardinalism in the 'additive' sense is therefore found quite untenable,
while in the 'measurable-up-to linear-transformation' sense it is found
completely inconsequential, except in an extreme situation, which is
demonstrably unreal" [Majumdar 1975, p. 135]. It should be noted that
the TCM is usually specified as a Marshallian demand function [Seller,
Stoll, and Chavas 1985, p. 162].
A Hicksian demand function is an ordinal ranking demand function.
Hicks operated directly from the utility function x(p, Uj. Instead of
minimizing expenditures as Marshall attempted, Hicks sought to maxi-
mize utility. Hicks devised an indexing method to resolve the income
substitution problems encountered by Marshall. Hicks assumed that
he was able to create an index of all goods except one, the numeraire.
In essence, this puts goods in what is called real terms. Or, price has
no real impact on the consumer choice. Thus, the sum of the cross par-
tials is equal to zero. In other words, Hicks resolved the substitution
and income effect problem of optimization. He achieved this by mon-
etizing the goods. He assumed that money is neutral (has no effect) on
real goods: therefore, there can be no income effect from price changes.
However, there are significant deficiencies in trying to operationalize
the Hicksian demand function. The first issue involved in determining
the validity ofthis construct is the assumption that money has a neutral
effect. The commodity chosen as a numeraire will affect the outcome
of the ordering [Arrow 1981, p. 142]. Also, the comparison between
two goods using a numeraire can only be made when "the market
clears." When this condition of equilibrium is not met, money matters
[Arrow 1981, p. 140]. Thus, changes in relative prices and changes in
the numeraire will change the outcome of a Hicksian demand function
preference ranking.
When an economist specifies a demand function in an econometric
model, the type and form ofthe demand function is based on the above
axioms rife with their conceptual difficulties. What is it these models
have measured? The results, the economic parameters, are interpreted
as the functional magnitude of the demand function. Thus, in a linear
model, the weighted variables' contribution to the slope of the demand
function account for a certain percent of the variation. The balance is
attributable to random error. What one cannot say is that this estima-
tion represents the demand function. The construct cannot account for
the functional dichotomy of substitution and income effects or any of
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the nonmonotonic discontinous complex behavior of people. In this
approach human behavior is assumed to be monotonic and the econ-
ometric model will insure that the results conform to this requirement.
The models force the data to fit a construct. What is important to gain
from this discussion of demand functions is that they are incapable of
modeling a complex system. Most economists agree that demand func-
tions, if they do exist, have never been observed and probably never
will [Varian 1984, p. 142].
The neoclassical debate on how to empirically measure demand
functions continues. However, the debate does not question the basic
axioms of consumer preference. The consumer preference axioms are
integral to the neoclassical model's ability to construct optimization so-
lutions. These derive the familiar conclusions that competition is a pa-
reto optimal solution in the allocation of resources. However, these
axioms do not yield usable operational rules for understanding real
world phenomena. The problems encountered by functional form, re-
strictive assumptions, and naive beliefs on how people value rank
goods leave consumer preference theory in the world of abstract con-
structs.
Other approaches for rank ordering preferences have attempted to
overcome the specification deficiencies of demand functions. One ap-
proach that has received attention is called revealed preference. This
set ofaxioms is the basis ofCVM. In the event that a demand function
cannot be revealed, it is still possible to generate comparative statics,
both sign and ordinal ranking of goods. The general axiom of revealed
preference is, ifx1 is revealed preferred to x2, then x2 cannot be strictly
revealed preferred to xl. xl R x2 implies not x2 R xl. This is the ob-
servable consequence of utility maximization in that if data satisfies
this axiom, the axiom is sufficient to meet the consumer preference axi-
oms. Again, what is so important to note is the nature of classical de-
ductive reasoning. If the data meets the revealed preference axiom, it
can be deduced that because this condition is sufficent to meet the con-
sumer preference axioms, the consumer preference axioms must be
true. Unfortunately, theoretical work in the area of game theory has
shown this axiom is invalid where strategies ofa game theory type can
be employed [Majumdar 1975, p. 139]. Game theory is used where con-
sumers perceive trade-offs in their decisionmaking. The conclusion re-
sulting from these game theory exercises is that the presence of choice
need not reveal preference. The distortion of preference in observed
choice suggests that preference may be sometimes revealed and some-
times distorted [Majumdar 1975, p. 143]. In other words, interpretation
of results cannot be made.
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This uncertainty in solution implies that revealed preference fails
one of the critical foundations of scientific analysis, the rejection of
plausible alternative hypotheses. What other explanations also satisfy
the revealed preference axiom? Have they all been scientifically re-
jected? If not, then the conclusion cannot be drawn that meeting the
revealed preference axiom implies the existence of consumer prefer-
ence as described by the consumer preference axioms. In contrast, the
conclusion drawn by neoclassicalists is that if there exists a utility func-
tion that could have generated that behavior, then the demand function
exists [Varian 1984, p. 143].
Neoclassical economists continue to search for a resolution to the
problem of empirically identifying demand functions. Another signifi-
cant problem yet to overcome is aggregation of consumer preferences.
It is not possible to derive a social welfare value by simply taking the
preference of one individual and multiplying it by the number of per-
sons in the society as explained by Arrow's impossibility theorem. The
impossibility theorem suggests that a society cannot have all individual
preferences met and achieve optimal social welfare simultaneously.
This is a problem that all public policymakers constantly confront in
creating legislation. There are always winners and losers when new
rules are imposed on society. The theoretical solution to resolving the
impossibility theorem is that one of the axioms must be violated. The
debate often surrounds dropping the pareto condition or the libertarian
condition [Sen 1976]. If the transitivity axiom is dropped, it may be
possible to have optimization both of individuals and of society [Mac-
kay 1980, p. 89]. But the transitivity axiom is a necessary condition of
consumer preference theory.
Consumer Preference and Non-market Goods
The notion ofusing Hicksian and Marshallian demand functions for
non-market goods adds further complications to identifying consumer
preference. The TCM and CVM are two examples ofattempts to meas-
ure the magnitude of value for non-market goods [Bishop and Heber-
lein 1979]. These approaches assume that people can and do make
comparisons among all goods. If this is true, then it should be possible
to construct a demand function for these goods. It is assumed that peo-
ple will value all normal goods in the same manner, or that the con-
sumer preference axioms hold for all normal goods. Nonmarket goods
do not have a price. Therefore, we do not know how people would re-
spond to the pricing of these goods.
The very nature ofnon-market goods suggests there is some attribute
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that cannot be captured by price. Thus, there will always be controversy
as to whether TCM and CVM understate or overstate the relative real
value. For example, when valuing the distance a person travels to visit
a recreational site, does the greater the distance driven imply this non-
market good is ofgreater value or does the person value the act ofdriv-
ing? What is the opportunity cost of travel time? These are questions
that cannot be answered by aggregating the cost of gasoline and auto
depreciation. Using a questionnaire format to answer these questions
only raises new methodological questions concerning the validity ofthe
results. Additionally, since demand functions have only been theoret-
ically defined for those goods that have competitive markets, the no-
tion that an indirect price can be constructed for a non-market good
will always leave the TCM and CVM methods open to question.
CVM and rCM Critiqued by the Application ofPsychometrics
The CV method uses a questionnaire format to solicit a Hicksian
preference value from individuals. The issue that needs to be addressed
is whether this is an appropriate technique for determining non-market
good valuation. This section will review the use of psychometrics and
its techniques as a methodology for revealing individual preferences.
It is important to understand the restrictions and limitations of this
measurement tool.
In psychometric theory there are very specific rules in questionnaire
development and evalution. These rules help insure that the instru-
ment (questionnaire) measures what it purports to measure. One ofthe
primary aspects of standardization requires that different people using
the same instrument or an alternative instrument measuring the same
trait should obtain similar results [Nunnally 1978, p. 3]. In the effort
to standardize instruments so that repeatability is possible, a set of cri-
teria is established that, if met, would provide reasonable confidence
in the accuracy of the results. A complete guarantee can never be
achieved because the consumer value for a non-market good is an
unobservable trait. The two rules relevant to the CVM are that a ques-
tionnaire should have both reliability and validity. Because ofthe great
potential for systematic error in the questionnaire approach, the instru-
ment must be carefully tested to generate the maximum confidence
possible that it is measuring what it is intended to measure, and that
the instrument measures the trait accurately.
Reliability relates to the internal structure of the instrument. In a tra-
ditional instrument there are a series ofquestions that purport to meas-
Contingent Valuation and Natural Resources 659
ure the same trait. Thus, by checking the covariance of the responses
to each question (Cronbach's coefficient alpha), one can identify
whether or not the items covary. If significant covariance exists, the
researcher can conclude that the items are measuring the same trait. It
is assumed that anyone question imperfectly measures the unobser-
vable trait. Thus, a series ofquestions that imperfectly measure the trait
are used so that an overall image of the trait emerges. In the absence
of using the reliability coefficient, an alternative check of reliability is
the test-retest method. In the latter case, the questionnaire instrument
is given to the same sample twice. After the initial survey, the ques-
tionnaire is given again several weeks later to see if the results are simi-
lar. There are serious defects in this approach that bias the reliability
either upward or downward. Respondents may remember their re-
sponses from the first interview, or they may have changed their minds
in response to an event occurring in the interval between interviews
[Nunnally 1978, Chap. 7].
The reliability of the CVM instrument is an open question. The na-
ture ofthe bidding game precludes the ability to compute a coefficient
alpha because the format is different from the traditional approach to
measuring an unobservable. The test-rest method could be used replete
with the problems inherent in the approach. Even with the inherent
problems, it may provide some insight into whether the instrument is
measuring consistently.
In most CVM studies, no significant attention is paid to reliability
and, therefore, it remains unclear if the CVM values generated are re-
peatable. Instead, the researchers compare their results with alternative
measures for the same population and the same non-market good. This
verification technique does not resolve the issues ofinstrument reliabil-
ity or accuracy. Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze argue that "all of
the comparison studies undertaken to date have failed to carefully as-
sess the accuracy either of the CVM used or the accuracy of the HPM
(or TCM) used for comparison" [Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze
1986, p. 72].
The second consideration is the issue ofvalidity. Several types ofva-
lidity measures are used to verify whether an instrument is measuring
what it purports to measure. The type of validity relevant here is con-
struct validity. When construct validity exists, it improves the confi-
dence that a correspondence between the abstract construct and the
instrument exists. This is a core issue for the CVM. Construct validity
is a necessary condition for theory testing. There are two aspects ofcon-
struct validity that must be considered. The first is termed internal
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(trait) validity. This is essentially a term to identify if the construct is
something different from other constructs. Essentially, this check tries
to identify if systematic variance exists within the instrument and if
this variance results in high correlations with other measures of the
construct, and low correlations with measures to which the construct
should not be related [Peter 1981, p. 207].
There are several approaches to establishing trait validity. One
method that has received attention is the multimethod multitrait ma-
trix. This technique attempts to identify what is termed convergent and
discriminant validity. Convergent validity refers to two instruments
with maximally different methods ofmeasuring the same construct that
are compared to see if their results converge. This is analogous to com-
paring TCM with CVM. The results should be similar if they are meas-
uring the same construct. Discriminant validity refers to using the same
method for different constructs to determine if there is low correlation
between the two constructs [Campbell and Fiske 1959].
This approach has been tried by researchers attempting to validate
their results by comparing different approaches for the same construct.
The TCM should yield similar results to the CVM. What the re-
searchers in the area of valuation of non-market goods have failed to
explore is whether or not using the same methodology for different con-
structs will result in similar values. Convergent and discriminant va-
lidity is necessary but not sufficient to validate the construct [Campbell
and Fiske 1959, p. 106]. By failing to pursue all available means to ver-
ify the existence of a construct, "we all stand to drown in a mass of
meaningless and potentially misleading junk" [Jacoby 1978, p. 87].
The second form of construct validity that must be considered is
nomological (lawlike) validity. This form of validity is based on the
explicit investigation of the constructs and measures in terms of a for-
mal hypothesis derived from theory. Nomological validation is inves-
tigating both the theoretical relationship between different constructs
and the empirical relationship between measures ofthose different con-
structs [Peter 1981, p. 135]. In other words, do the results ofCVM con-
firm or contradict neoclassical theory? An affirmative answer is a
necessary condition for the acceptance of the instrument. Given all the
problems associated with trying to measure an unobservable, except
through hypothesized rules of correspondence, researchers conclude
that a single study cannot validate the construct. In addition, it is not
possible to conclude that the instrument is measuring what it purports
to measure. This is essentially a form ofexternal validation. "Even ten-
tative acceptance of construct validity requires some amount of aggre-
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gation of results including both logical and deductive reasoning and a
series of reliability and validity studies ... In fact ... the most impor-
tant implication of construct validation is the increased emphasis on
the role oftheory in validation" [Peter 1981, p. 135]. Results that con-
tradict theory should be carefully considered before measure is ac-
cepted. For example, the systematic error in CVM between the
willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) measures is
a case of unresolved construct validity. R.D. Willig [1976] argued that
price changes and A. Randall and J.R. Stoll [1983] argued that quantity
changes will have small income effects. Therefore, the substitution
effect is observable. This conclusion is consistent with the theoretical
constraints of the Hicksian demand functions so that WTP and WTA
should be close for a given individual. The empirical results, however,
demonstrate that WTA is consistently larger, on the order of three to
five times larger, than measures ofWTP [Cummings, Brookshire, and
Schulze 1986, p. 35].
Another potential problem in using questionnaires arises in the areas
of demand artifacts and self-generated validity. Demand artifacts in-
clude all aspects of the experiment that cause the subject to perceive,
interpret, and act upon what he believes is expected or desired of him
by the interviewer. These artifacts can take the form of the "faithful"
subject providing answers that the subject believes the researcher
wants, or the subject may take a negative or apprehensive role [Sawyer
1975, p. 20]. The CVM questionnaires have attempted to reduce this
effect by fully explaining the process to gain the trust of the subject and
to discard what are perceived as protest bids. A protest bid is the case
in which the response ofan individual is not consistent with that ofhis
peers. The demand artifact also has been noted to be biased by what
has been termed "starting point bias," that is, the subject perceives the
relevant range ofacceptable bids by the level where the bidding process
begins, and thus, the results are biased [Cummings, Brookshire, and
Schulze 1986, pp. 29-34].
A more serious demand artifact problem in the hypothetical market
technique is trying to measure a trait that does not already exist in long
term memory. In the CVM, respondents are asked to value non-market
goods in terms of dollars. It is likely that many of the subjects have
never considered this exercise before. What may occur is that the ques-
tionnaire becomes directive in how the subject will respond. How the
market is presented to the subject may determine his beliefs about the
market. This is especially a problem when the subject is required to
value natural resources or an ecosystem the respondent does not under-
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stand and has usually never observed. Having no foundation in his
memory, the presented market becomes the basis for his decision [Feld-
man and Lynch 1988, p. 424]. What is likely to occur after the interview
is that the respondent may well further reflect on the exercise and
change his mind. Again, CVM is aware of the information bias [Cum-
mings, Brookshire, and Schulze 1986, p. 33], but proposes that a more
complete education will reduce the problem. In the case of self-
generated validity, the respondent must already have considered the
valuation problem and drawn conclusions to avoid this type of bias.
While psychometrics and econometrics are similar in attempting to
test refutable hypotheses, there is one significant difference between
them. In psychometrics, when the hypothesis is rejected, the re-
searchers must consider whether the model is misspecified, the data is
biased, or whether the construct is invalid. In econometrics, the con-
struct (neoclassical foundation) is not questioned. The model may be
misspecified, the data may be biased, or the sample may be inadequate.
But hypothesis testing does not refute theory.
Empirical Studies: Travel Cost Method
The studies that have used the TCM have met with limited success.
The problems with model specification and data limitation have biased
the results so that the authors themselves have seriously questioned the
validity of the conclusions. These studies are premised on the assump-
tion that demand functions exist for non-market goods. Most of the
studies use a Marshallian demand function. The results derived from
these demand functions contradict the a priori predictions of the the-
ory. The most common explanations given for the failure ofthese stud-
ies are two significant problems that confront the researchers. The first
problem is the additivity of individual demand functions across sites
and across activities to arrive at an aggregate value. The second related
problem is the severe data limitations that restrict the specification of
the demand functions to keep them consistent with theory.
The William H. Desvousges and Kerry V. Smith study on the value
of water quality improvement for the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) addressed the additivity and data limitations
ofthis approach [Desvousges and Smith 1984]. The results ofthis study
were similar to an earlier study on water quality for the EPA conducted
by Desvousges, Smith, and Matthew P. McGivney [Desvousges, Smith,
and McGivney 1983]. The conclusion of the 1983 study was that the
explanatory power of the models used was not high [Desvousges,
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Smith, and McGivney al. 1983, pp. 1-10]. In the 1984 study, the au-
thors attempted to improve the model specification of the demand
function. As a validity check on their results, both Hicksian and Mar-
shallian demand functions were specified in order to compare the re-
sults with theory.
Desvousges and Smith were forced to assume that the individual
utility functions were equal for all individuals for each activity to re-
solve the additivity problem [Desvousges and Smith 1984, pp. 2-21].
The model requires monotonically separable demand functions but,
due to data limitations, the authors were forced to assume an average
mean user as a representative individual. The results were disap-
pointing to the authors, who recognized the ad hoc nature of their as-
sumptions [Desvousges and Smith 1984, pp. 2-28]. The crudeness of
these assumptions seriously affects the quality of the results.
In many instances the estimated coefficients did not agree a priori
with the expected signs [Desvousges and Smith 1984, pp. 6-38]. Theory
predicts that the Marshallian consumer surplus should be greater than
the Hicksian surplus. The results contradicted theory [Desvousges and
Smith 1984, pp. 7-21]. In an attempt to explain the results, the authors
suggested that one significant contributor to the poor results was the
use ofthe proxy variable, the mean user. The mean user included a mix
ofactivities undertaken at a site, which is clearly inconsistent with the-
ory [Desvousges and Smith 1984, pp. 6-38]. Additionally, the authors
recognized that the variables specified, and the valuation assumptions
made, make a substantial difference in the final benefit estimates [Des-
vousges and Smith 1984, pp. 8-24]. For example, each individual's val-
uation of the opportunity cost of travel time to a site is unknown. For
some people travel time is perceived as a form of recreation, while for
others it is time lost from work. These different valuations cannot be
summed to a meaningful aggregate. Thus, the researcher is forced to
assume a value for travel time that is difficult to verify as accurate.
The Meta Systems report prepared for the EPA reached similar con-
clusion. [Meta Systems 1987]. They argued that the values generated
should not be taken as important or precise in themselves. In other
words, they are only approximations. They believed their calculated
values were a result oftheir assumptions. The researchers believed that
their assumptions were conservative and therefore underestimated the
true value of consumer surplus [Meta Systems 1987, pp. 1-25]. When
their TCM results were compared with the CVM results, they failed to
converge. The authors emphasized that these results underscore the
limitations and shortcomings of these methodologies [Meta Systems
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little better than the TCM studies. While similar problems exist for the
CVM with respect to using utility functions, these studies introduce an
additional source of potential error through the use of hypothetical
markets and questionnaire format for data collection.
Whereas most of the attention in the studies using the TCM focused
on the model specification and data limitation problems, the CVM
studies focused on the problems ofvalidity. These models, in constrast
to the TCM, primarily used the Hicksian demand function that as-
sumes utility remains constant when calculating monetary value for the
non-market goods. This approach assumes away the additivity and sep-
arability issues but still contains the state-dependent problems.
In constructing a hypothetical market, the researchers are confronted
with several tasks. The first is determining how to reveal the value of
the goods. This involves educating the respondents as to the nature of
the hypothetical market. To get the respondents to valuate these non-
market goods, two approaches have been tried: WTP for using the good
and WTA for not using the good. Theoretically, these two valuations
should be approximately the same, assuming no income effect. The re-
sults of the research that used both approaches found that there was a
significant divergence between the two measures. The WTP tended to
undervalue the asset, while the WTA tended to overvalue the asset. The
over and under valuation is based on the valuations in relation to each
other, since there is no market valuation ofthe goods [Bishop, Heber-
lien, and Kealy, 1983, p. 620]. In this sense, we do not know if the re-
sults of the two measures are under, over, or otherwise skewed. These
results contradict the a priori theory that suggests that the two measures
should be approximately the same given the predicted small income
effect. This lack ofconvergence is particularly worrisome. The founda-
tion of the utility function hypothesis is based on R.D. Willig's asser-
tion that the two measures should be synonymous [Willig 1976]. To
avoid this a priori contradiction, many studies "have not even bothered
to estimate WTA" [Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze 1986, p. 137].
A second primary issue with the CVM approach is how to solicit the
WTP valuation from respondents. Most authors have chosen a bidding
process in which an initial price for the non-market good is offered.
The respondent then indicates ifthe bid is low or high. The bid is then
adjusted accordingly until the respondent feels his value on the non-
market good is reflected. This method has received much analysis and
criticism for what is called starting point bias. If the opening bid is too
low, then it appears that this will bias downward the respondent's final
choice of value. The converse is also true. If it starts too high, it will
bias upward the final bid [Boyle, Bishop, and Welsh 1985, p. 193]. The
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study done by Seller, Stoll, and Chavas used both an open-ended for-
mat in which the respondent provided the valuation, and a closed-
ended format in which the respondent answered yes or no to the stated
value [Seller, Stoll, and Chavas 1983]. Revealing in this exercise were
the substantially different results that occurred. The authors concluded
that the open-ended format may be unreliable because of the negative
consumer surplus and the low results this methodology produced
[Seller, Stoll, and Chavas 1985, p. 175]. However, an alternative expla-
nation could account for the low results of the open-ended question-
naire and the relatively better performance of the closed-ended
questionnaire. First, it may be that individuals who have not valued
the good in question in a market-oriented setting may be unable to
place a value on the non-market good. Second, the close-ended ques-
tionnaire may have a starting point bias, or may be creating self-
generated valuations on the basis ofhow the information is presented.
The self-generated construct is one of the most significant issues
confronting the CVM. "The specific valuation problem may be so re-
mote from the respondents' market valuation experiences as to leave
him unable to respond reliably" [Brockstael, McConnell, and Strand
1988, p. 25]. Thus, several researchers advocate either educating the
respondent sufficiently that he is able to respond intelligently [Thayer
1981, p. 38], or interviewing only those who have proximity and there-
fore, knowledge of the non-market good [Beasley, Workman, and Wil-
liams 1986]. Either approach introduces a bias that diminishes the
reliability ofthe results. Additionally, the second case ignores the exis-
tence value of the non-market good-that is, those who will never use
the good, but gain value from knowing that it is there. Cummings et al.
conclude that the CVM may yield accurate values where respondents
have made actual choices for the good in a market framework. Their
review of the CVM studies does not show that people are capable of
making the valuations the CVM is asking of them [Cummings, Brook-
shire, and Schulze 1986, p. 102].
Like the TCM results, the CVM results have generally been disap-
pointing. The studies caution the reader that the results do not have
high enough internal reliability or generalizability to justify conclusions
[Smith and Desvousges 1987; Desvousges et al. 1987b; Brockstael, Mc-
Connell, and Strand 1988; Bishop and Heberlien 1979; and Seller, Stoll,
and Chavas 1985]. The errors most commonly identified by the authors
are hypothetical bias, strategic bias, information bias, and interviewer
bias [Cronin 1982, p. ix]. There is considerable debate on the signifi-
cance of each of these biases and discussion on how to minimize each
bias. These discussions usually surround why the studies failed to pro-
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vide significant results or why they contradicted a priori theory predic-
tions. For example, in the Kerry V. Smith and William H. Desvousges
[1987] study on the value of risk changes, the results rejected the hy-
pothesis of a declining marginal valuation of risk with reductions of
the risk level [Smith and Desvousges 1987, p. 109]. The authors ob-
serve that this seems to contradict rational behavior. The Cronin study
in 1982 identified respondents engaged in strategic voting [Cronin
1982, pp. 6-10]. This implies that true preferences are not being re-
vealed by the respondents. Bishop and Heberlien, in reviewing the bias
of their goose permit study, suggest that "when summed together these
potential problems are sufficient to justify considerable skepticism
about the accuracy of the resulting values estimates" [Bishop and
Heberlien 1979, p. 926].
The CVM has been critically reviewed in a recent book by Ronald
G. Cummings, David S. Brookshire, and William D. Schulze [1986].
The editors focus on what they consider to be the core issues sur-
rounding CVM. The first issue is the sources of bias in the CVM. The
second issue is the accuracy ofthe method. The bias issue is at the foun-
dation of their debate in that, if substantial bias exists, it casts serious
doubt on the validity of the method. The authors emphasize the need
to focus on the range of divergence between the WTP and WTA. They
also urge that a standard for what is an acceptable range consistent with
a priori theory (starting point bias) should be established. Two causes
have been identified for this divergence between the WTP and WTA.
The divergence may occur as a result ofhow the respondent is to make
his offered payment (vehicle bias) and the lack ofincentive for accurate
valuation because the respondents are spending hypothetical dollars
(hypothetical bias) [Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze 1986, chap. 3].
After the studies were reviewed for accuracy, eight were chosen.
When comparing the results of CVM with another indirect market
measure (TCM), the hypothesis that the measures were the same was
rejected [Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze 1986, p. 105]. Rejection
ofthe hypotheses resulted from lack offamiliarity with the non-market
good, lack of experience in valuing the non-market good, uncertainty
in the choice structure, and lack of resolution between WTP and WTA
criteria.
Many of the authors still cling to their belief that CVM can be used
in public decisionmaking. They argue that the biases may be identified
or mitigated, and that the difference between actual versus hypothetical
payment is weak [Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze 1986, pp. 146
and 242]. However the authors agree that the CVM is most likely to
succeed where the operationalization of the hypothetical market
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occurs-in other words, where participants are familiar with the non-
market good and have experience in valuating the good and also under-
stand the hypothetical market valuation method. When these
conditions hold, it is also the case that there are other methods avail-
able in addition to CVM.
Appropriateness Conclusion
The results of the travel cost method and contingent valuation
method have generally been unverifiable and burdened with significant
operationalization problems. Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze con-
clude their review by saying that the "CVM may not be as hopeless as
we and others earlier believed. 'Promise' is not 'performance', however,
and our assessment refers only to the potential promise ofthe CVM as
a viable method for estimating values for public goods. The realization
of that promise implies real challenges for theoretical and empirical
research" [Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze 1986, p. 234]. Their
conclusion about TCM as a viable method is even more pessimistic.
"The environmental (and other public good) 'commodities' for which
the TCM or RPM might be used for valuation purposes are very lim-
ited, however" [Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze 1986, p. 6].
Cummings et al. fail to raise the fundamental issue of the appropri-
ateness of the theoretical framework used for these models. Regardless
of the efforts to make the models more sophisticated, or to create new
data sources, doubt remains as to whether these methods will produce
results that have meaning.
CVM and TCM Critiqued with GSA Principles
The adverse criticism related above regarding CVM and TCM was
from within the neoclassical paradigm, as articulated in the neoclassical
literature for the neoclassical context. This criticism, however, does not
apply to the systems context. In this section CVM and TCM will be
compared to General Systems Analysis (GSA) principles. The CVM
and TCM methodologies are inconsistent with GSA, and are not an
attempt to define or evaluate a system. Next, GSA principles will be
defined and used as standards by which to judge the adequacy of the
CV and TC methodologies. Any methodology is adequate for some
context. For example, systems of mathematical mind games can be
judged to be adequate in the context of mind games. The task here is
to judge methodological adequacy with respect to a real-world system
context.
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System Defined
"A system is a set of objects together with relationships between the
objects and between their attributes" [Hall and Fagen 1968, p. 81]. Ob-
jects are the elements and components ofthe system. Attributes are the
properties of the elements and components, and relationships are what
tie the system together. The relationships to be considered "depend on
the problem at hand, important or interesting relationships being in-
cluded, trivial or uninteresting relationships excluded" [Hall and Fagen
1968, p. 82]. To use Kenyon B. De Greene's definition, "in the most
general sense, a system can be thought of as being a number or set of
constituents or elements in active organized interaction as a bounded
entity, such as to achieve a common whole or purpose which tran-
scends that of the constituents in isolation" [De Greene 1973, p. 4].
There is no end to a system. Any relationship or delivery between
components leads to additional deliveries, and to positive and negative
feedback deliveries. One-dimensional systems (such as would be impli-
cit in an assumption that human consumption is the end of the eco-
nomic system) are not real world systems.
The main GSA criticism of neoclassical valuation is that one aspect,
market demand, ofone system element, the human agent, is being used
for system evaluation in a manner that treats the human element as the
only user ofthe ecosystem. A fundamental principle ofthe modem sys-
tems approach is to avoid the analysis ofan entity in isolation. To over-
come the dangers inherent in the human need to categorize the universe
into separate entities, "every system must be analyzed within the con-
text ofits environment" [Mattessich 1978, p. 21]. However, the context
ofCVM and TCM is not a system within an environment; their context
is utility analysis.
Utility is a more fundamental problem to these techniques than the
isolation problem just mentioned, because utility does not exist in the
real world. Therefore, neither does a utility function exist. This is read-
ily made explicit by most economists. As Hal R. Varian has stated, "a
utility function ... should not be given a psychological interpretation"
[Varian 1984, p. 112]. Lionel Robbins, a respected participant in the
pure theory of utility analysis has stated that it "has had a perennial
fascination for some of the best minds on the subject" [Robbins 1975,
p. ix]. However, he clarifies that "the pure theory ofvalue is not one of
those branches of economic analysis which have any immediate bear-
ing on practice" [Robbins 1975, p. ix]. The economist Tapas Majum-
dar, in his book on the Measurement of Utility (which is not about
trying to measure utility in a real world sense), states that "on more
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than one occasion in the preceding pages, we have made the observa-
tion that the nature of welfare perception in the physiological or psy-
chological sense is necessarily beyond the scope of our discipline"
[Majumdar 1975, p. 32]. Herbert A. Simon explained in his Nobel Prize
recipient lecture that on the basis of numerous studies, the idea that
people behaved so as to maximize subjective expected utility (SEU)
was false.
The refutation of the theory has to do with the substance of the decisions,
and not just the process by which they are reached. It is not that people
do not go through the calculations that would be required to reach the
SED decisions-neoclassical thought has never claimed that they did.
What has been shown is that they do not even behave as ifthey had carried
out those calculations, and that result is a direct refutation of the neoclas-
sical assumptions [Simon 1979, p. 507].
The social and psychological sciences rejected the idea of utility
around the tum of the century. After hedonism, utility, and instinct
theory fell into disrepute, an attempt was made in social psychology to
substitute other reductionist ideas. These, however, fell into disrepute,
and psychology came to the same conclusion as GSA-that individual
beliefs, attitudes, and tastes are the result of an integrated system, not
arising from individualistic natures, or hedonistic urges, or utility.
[Harre 1983].
The reductionist approach, which attempted to leave social welfare
to utility calculation, was also denied by the historical tide. The tide
turned toward government policy to protect and enhance social and
economic welfare. The claims of utility calculation and hedonism
"when tested in the crucible of social policy, proved inadequate" [All-
port 1985].
It is worthwhile to know ofthe origins ofthe idea ofa utility function
in order to understand why economists as well as psychologists and
social psychologists have rejected the idea. Philip Mirowski has ex-
plained its origin in a number of articles. It came from an energy for-
mula of mid-nineteenth century physics, not from experiments or
observations ofhumans. The utility function was "asserted to represent
a gravitational field, which by the 1860s was also identified as the field
of potential energy. This is why Tjalling Koopmans can state that "a
utility function ofa consumer looks quite similar to a potential function
in the theory ofgravitation" [Koopmans 1957, p. 176]. "The metaphor
ofenergy utility which was appropriated by neoclassical economics was
derived from the physics of a specific historical moment, namely, the
years ofthe mid-nineteenth century just prior to the elaboration of the
second law of thermodynamics" [Mirowski 1987, pp. 84-85]. There
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was no empirical base or even introspection that would indicate human
rationality should be defined "as the maximization of an objective
function over a conserved entity" [Mirowski 1987, p. 84]. Instead, our
economic ancestors were quite honest that they were borrowing the
physical metaphor to render consumption theory a mathematical sci-
ence. "Jevons (1905b, p. 50), Walras (1960), Edgeworth (1881), and
nearly every other early neoclassical economist admitted this fact" [Mi-
rowski 1987, p. 83].
In any case, the concept of utility is a unidimensional concept that
assumes that human utility maximization is the end or purpose of the
system. Thus it ignores the elements, constituents, components, and
their relationships, and therefore the concept is inconsistent with GSA.
Openness
All real-world systems are open systems, and all open systems are
non-eqilibrium systems. "Open systems are those with a continuous
flow of energy, information or materials from environment to system
and return" [De Greene 1973, p. 36]. There are misconceptions that
arise both in theory and practice when social organizations are regarded
as closed rather than open. "The major misconception is the failure to
recognize fully that the organization is continually dependent upon in-
puts from the environment and that the inflow ofmaterials and human
energy is not a constant" [Katz and Kahn 1976, p. 101]. Systems and
their environments are open to each other, as are subsystems within
the systems. Living systems both adapt to their environment and mod-
ify their environment.
GSA divides the analysis between the system under consideration
and its environment. The system description is referred to as the inter-
nal description, or the state of the system. However, all systems are
influenced by an external description outside the boundaries ofthe sys-
tem. An example is the work of EPA's Environmental Monitoring and
Assessment Program (EMAP). EMAP has found that a wetland ecology
receives inputs such as contaminants, sediment, and nutrients from ag-
riculture ["Environmental Monitoring ... " 1989]. Although inputs
from (often called forcings) and outputs to (often called responses) the
external environment are important to the system, no attempt is made
to define the environment's structure. It only has a functional "black
box" description to the system. The term environment as used in sys-
tems analysis may mean an ecosystem, for example, ifthe system under
study is a socioeconomic system. If the system of interest is an ecosys-
tem, then the socioeconomic system is the environment. This concept
is displayed in Figure 1.
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In systems analysis, environment refers to the functional area outside
the system. Because real world systems are constantly open to their en-
vironment, they cannot reach an equilibrium state. It is one ofthe goals
ofanalysis to match up the two kinds of system descriptions. "The ex-
ternal description is a functional one; it tells us what the system does,
but not in general how it does it. The internal description, on the other
hand, is a structural one; it tells us how the system does what it does"
[Rosen 1972, p. 53].
Four external functions ofthe natural environment for the social sys-
tem have been defined by D.W. Pearce in his Environmental Econom-
ics and refined by James A. Swaney [1987]. The functions are:
1. Natural goods production, which includes wilderness, greenery,
landscape, scenery, and so forth. It is often competitive with natural
resource production, and is restricted in quality and quantity by the
production of effluents from households and production centers.
2. Natural resources, the raw material and energy sources flowing
from the environment, upon which the production of goods and ser-
vices is dependent. Natural resources represent only part of one of the
two flows from the environment to the economy. They flow to the pri-
vate and public production centers.
3. Life support services represent the services necessary for life in the
environment, human communities, and the workplace. They include
oxygen for workers in the economy and carbon dioxide that is
"breathed" by farmer's fields. Life support services provided by the en-
vironment are hampered by growth in the production of economic
goods. "Pearce's key point is that the life support system cannot
be ... priced or otherwise allocated by the economy" [Swaney 1987, p.
337].
4. The sinkfunction refers to the fact that all "wastes" from all parts
ofthe environment and from the economy are disposed ofin the envi-
ronment. This sink function can no longer be taken for granted, because
overloading the sinks with wastes and pollution from households and
production centers increasingly interferes with the environment's other
three functions.
CVM and TCM are based on the idea ofclosed equilibrium systems,
and therefore are inconsistent with open systems. The equilibrium con-
cept that defines them is not open to inputs from or outputs to the en-
vironment, and therefore CVM and TCM are not modeled to account
for those inputs and outputs. "A part viewed in isolation cannot be un-
derstood as well, than when viewed (1) in its environmental setting and
(2) under consideration ofessential interdependencies with other parts"
[Mattessich 1978, p. 323].
674 W. David Eberle and F. Gregory Hayden
Nonisomorphic
Real world systems are not isomorphic from part to whole. In iso-
morphic systems the whole is a reflection of the parts-for example,
the sum of the parts. The idea that systems can be studied by looking
at individual parts is referred to as reductionism. In living systems, the
parts work according to the structure of the system. Work procedures
are guided by the requirements ofthe technology and human consump-
tion is guided by social requirements. GSA allows investigators to ac-
complish two procedures very important to an investigation. First, it
allows for abstracting the system of interest from the overwhelming
complexity of the real world. Second, it provides a means of disag-
gregating the system into subsystems without practicing reductionism.
As Rosen has explained, a reductionist hypothesis cannot be true for
many of the defined properties of greatest interest about systems. [Ro-
sen 1972, p. 55]. The task thus is to disaggregate or fractionate a system
into nonisomorphic systems so that "(a) each of the fractions, in isola-
tion, is capable of being completely understood, and most important,
that (b) any property of the original system can be reconstructed from
the relevant properties of the fractional subsystems" [Rosen 1972, p.
53]. In this way, subsystems can be effectively used to give us informa-
tion about the original system.
Real-world systems are not isomorphic reflections from part to
whole. Central to GSA is the "notion that a system is characterized by
the fact that it is more than the sum ofthe parts" [Mattessich 1978, p.
20]. Yet the underlying assumption, as well as the operation ofCVM
and TCM, is that the whole is the sum of the parts. Thus, instead of
disaggregating the individual's beliefs, attitudes, and tastes from the
system under study, the reductionist approach is to attempt to sum up
the value ofnatural resources, for example, from the survey findings of
individuals. This concept is the reason CVM studies ignore the under-
pinnings of their own paradigm by assuming that all individuals are
equal to the mean user. The investigators want to sum to the whole
from the parts.
Equifinality
The equifinality property of systems means that open systems "can
reach the same final state from differing initial conditions and along a
variety of paths" [De Greene 1973, p. 37]. Because systems are not au-
tomatic equilibrium systems, they respond to changes in the external
environment to achieve a system goal. Only by adjusting the system
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can open systems attain a steady state. The degree of equifinality is re-
duced as more control mechanisms are introduced [Katz and Kahn
1976, p. 100]. Ifa technology rigidly sets the requirements of the social
system, the flexibility of the social system in dealing with pollution, for
example, is reduced.
The concept of equifinality becomes important when determining
the restoration of an ecosystem. Since there are alternative paths to
achieving system viability, some paths may be less expensive in re-
sources than other paths.
The CV and TC methods do not offer more than one path to explain
system value, nor do they offer a way to elucidate the alternative paths
within a system.
System Components
Real world systems studies, whether they are called sociotechnical,
socioenvironmental, or socioeconomic, are concerned with the integra-
tion of the components of the social, technical, and natural environ-
mental subsystems. The components of these systems are: (1) cultural
values, (2) social beliefs, (3) personal attitudes, (4) technology, (5) social
institutions, and (6) the natural environment [Hayden 1982 and 1988].
The CVM and TCM do not attempt to define and deal with the var-
ious components of a system. In addition, the way the CVM survey
instrument deals with beliefs, attitudes, and tastes makes it impossible,
as is described by some of the CVM investigators, to know what the
results of the survey mean. In the first place, this survey instrument is
attempting to measure a taste and tastes are not important for valuing
social or ecological systems. In addition, as explained by investigators
who complete CV surveys, beliefs overwhelm tastes. This is consistent
with findings in social psychology, because beliefs and systems of be-
liefs (ideology) are the basic social criteria, and the determinants of at-
titudes and tastes. This means, according to Daniel Kahneman,
that we should exercise great caution in measuring option values and
reservation values, because responses that are obtained in such measure-
ments are likely to be heavily loaded with ideological content.... The key
observation is that there is a class of problems in which people's answers
to preference questions seem quite insensitive to the numbers that are
mentioned in these questions. Indeed, people seem to be ready with an
answer before the relevant numbers are specified [Kahneman 1986, p.
190].
Kahneman points out that people have their minds made up on what
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they want done; for example, if they want the environment cleaned up,
no matter what CV questions are asked or how the questions are spec-
ified, the answer is the same-it reflects (but does not measure) the be-
liefs at which the respondents have arrived. That is why demand
functions for very different cleanup operations come out strikingly sim-
ilar. The respondents are not considering the monetary price. In a Ca-
nadian CVM study, "the results indicate that people seem to be willing
to pay about as much to clean up one region or any other, and almost
as much for anyone region as for all Ontario together" [Kahneman
1986, p. 191]. The failure to distinguish among beliefs and tastes in a
system context prevents the CV approach from obtaining relevant data.
Control and Regulation
Crucial to systems and therefore an important focus of GSA are the
control and regulation mechanisms ofsystems. System control and reg-
ulation takes place through rules, requirements, and criteria. Two types
of control are emphasized in GSA.
The first type of control is that every system element or subsystem
that makes a delivery to another element or system exerts control "if
its behavior is either necessary or sufficient for subsequent behavior of
the other element or system (or itself), and the subsequent behavior is
necessary or sufficient for the attainment of one or more of its goals"
[Ackoff 1971, p. 670]. This is a control through relationship and re-
quirement linkages. An example is the effect of habitat cover on the
kind and structure of wildlife in the habitat.
However, before elements or systems can perform the behavior pat-
tern that gives them the first type of linkage control, other control
mechanisms and rules are needed to determine their behavior. These
constitute the second type of control. "Biological and social structures
are not objective in the sense of physical laws. They are coherent sys-
tems obeying dynamic laws and syntactical rules that are distinguished
from isolate physical systems by their ability to change their internal
constraints and thereby change the rules of the game" [Pattee 1976, p.
179].
DNA is an example of system rules that give DNA extraordinary au-
thority over the cellular collectivity, and
the development ofmulticellular organisms ... shows that the cells do not
simply aggregate to form the individual, as atoms aggregate to form crys-
tals. There are chemical messages from the collections of cells that con-
strain the detailed genetic expression of individual cells that make up the
collection. Although each cell began as an autonomous "typical" unit with
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its own rules of replication and growth, in the collection each cell finds
additional selective rules imposed on it by the collection which causes the
differentiation [Pattee 1973, p. 77].
The presence ofcontrols and constraints in a system is a distinguishing
characteristic of living systems.
Technology is another example of system rules. It provides require-
ments for social systems. These are often in the form of criteria that
must be met. The technical component "contributes preeminently to
the self-regulating features of the system" [De Greene 1973, p. 47].
"Thus the technological system sets requirements" [De Greene 1973,
p.47].
In social systems, primary rules are social belief criteria. They give
the social system structure. "Social structure consists of myths, con-
straints, rules, customs, beliefs, legal codes, and the like. These struc-
ture social systems by guiding social and economic action, by
legitimizing transactions, and by requiring delivery to be made" [Hay-
den 1986, p. 386]. As James Swaney has clarified, in addition to the
cellular, technological, and social, there are ecological constraints,
rules, and criteria that we are attempting to ignore in modem real world
systems [Swaney 1985]. These are also part of the system, and an at-
tempt to override them will degrade the system.
The market approaches to natural resource valuation do not include
any explanations of the control and regulation mechanisms in the sys-
tem that direct the socioecological system. The CV and TC survey
questionnaires separate individuals from the system and tum the nat-
ural environment into an isolated object, and then request that indi-
viduals respond to objects without respect to eliciting or explaining
social, technological, or ecological criteria or control requirements.
Hierarchy
Following the discussion on system control devices, it is probably
not surprising that all systems experience hierarchical arrangements of
many kinds. Laszlo has defined hierarchies as "higher order systems
which within their particular environments constitute systems of still
more indecisive order" [Laszlo 1972, p. 19]. Pattee emphasized the con-
trol aspects of hierarchy. He wrote:
In a control hierarchy the upper level exerts a specific dynamic constraint
on the details of the motion at a lower level, so that the fast dynamics of
the lower level cannot simply be averaged out. The collection of subunits
that forms the upper level in a structural hierarchy now also acts as a con-
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straint on the motions of selected individual subunits. This amounts to a
feedback path between levels. Therefore the physical behavior ofa control
hierarchy must take into account at least two levels at a time [Pattee 1973,
p. 77, emphasis added].
The emphasis was added to Pattee's quote to emphasize criteria meth-
odologies need to meet. CVM and TCM do not meet these criteria.
There is no attempt with CVM or TCM to define or determine the
system hierarchy or to determine the relationships among different lev-
els in the hierarchy. There is an assumption that the utilitarian moral
principle of maximizing individual utility is a criterion that should be
placed above all other criteria in a system [Rohrlich 1976, p. xxiii].
Flows, Deliveries, and Sequences
Systems could be defined as flows of sequenced deliveries. The con-
cept of flow is fundamental to systems.
Internal and external descriptions of systems are wholly complementary
approaches to modeling systems structures and this equivalence can be
seen through the unifying concept of flow. If a system has been described
internally in terms of a number of state variables between which are de-
fined certain relational functions, then these state variables can be consid-
ered to change as a result of flows occurring [Bryant 1980, p. 73].
Through input flows from the natural system into socioeconomic
systems, resource analysis is completed. It is also important to explic-
itly include output flow to determine environmental impact assessment
and valuation. "The delivery flow through the process is the substance
of socioeconomic life, and is a way to measure thresholds of change.
Within a system, there are tolerance levels with regard to variation of
deliveries" [Hayden 1986, p. 387].
Systems respond to flows according to the level, or amount, of the
flow. It is through flow levels that systems are integrated. For example,
the level of aggregate demand delivered in the economy influences the
level of employment. Delivery levels outside the tolerable threshold
will create negative feedback for change. For example, the food deliv-
eries may be inadequate or the air pollution level too great.
The goal of CVM and TCM is to measure the monetary value ofthe
flow of utility to individuals. There is no attempt, however, to define
system flows or to outline the network of deliveries and sequences.
Negative and Positive Feedback
For policy purposes, especially with regard to the natural environ-
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ment, the system concept ofnegative and positive feedback is very im-
portant. "Negative feedback is associated with self-regulation and
goal-direction, positive feedback with growth and decay" [De Greene
1973, p. 22]. The inputs of living systems consist not only of energy
and material, but also of information, all of which "furnish signals to
the structure about the environment and about its own functioning in
relation to the environment" [Katz and Kahn 1966, p. 95]. Feedback
is a form of inter- and intra-systemic communication in which the past
performance of the system yields information to guide its present and
future performance. Negative feedback systems are error-activated and
goal seeking in that the goal state is compared with information inputs
on the actual state and any difference (error) provides an input to direct
the system toward the goal state. Negative feedback thus leads to the
convergence ofsystem behavior toward some goal. "When the system's
negative feedback stops, its steady state disappears, and the system ter-
minates" [De Greene 1973, p. 78]. It has been argued that one of the
main benefits of democracy is the negative feedback and interference
from the citizen's government that serves as the comparator to evaluate
the condition of the system.
What makes the open systems approach so vibrant from a policy
standpoint is the fact that it views the environment as being an integral
part of the functioning ofa sociotechnical system. Thus, external forces
that affect the system need to be included in the system. Furthermore,
negative feedback mechanisms are needed to provide information
about environmental changes that will affect the system, in order to
better understand what, if any, policies need to be made to insure a
continued effective system.
Positive feedback systems, in which positive feedback information
overwhelms negative feedback information, tend to be unstable if a
change in the original level of the system provides an input for further
change in the same direction. "Society and technology tend to reinforce
one another in a positive feedback manner, which is not always desir-
able. At the same time there is often a loss of negative feedback and
self regulation" [De Greene 1973, p. 7]. For example, if an agricultural
system based on advanced technology is not incorporating the negative
information regarding soil erosion, the system will continue its growth
until destruction.
With the CVM and TCM techniques, respondents to the surveys are
not allowed to have negative or positive feedback information from
the rest ofthe system iftheir responses are used for making policy. They
are not presented with alternative system consequences; thus, they are
not allowed to make error-activated responses, as they would in a sur-
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vey that attempted to replicate responses in a democratic system.
Even within the CVM context, as Smith and Desvousges point out,
results are influenced by the failure to generate feedback from which
respondents can learn. "An important source ofthe available empirical
evidence, and laboratory experiments suggest that individuals may
have difficulty in dealing with the concept of compensation. This is es-
pecially true when there is no opportunity for individuals to learn about
transactions that involve compensation through experience" [Smith
and Desvousges 1986, p. 291].
Differentiation and Elaboration
"The unique character of biological and social system behavior that
distinguishes them from non-living systems is their tendency to evolve
greater and more significant complexity" [Pattee 1978, p. 99]. This idea
has been expressed in almost all disciplines. Katz and Kahn have stated
with regard to social systems that "open systems move in the direction
of differentiation and elaboration.... Social organizations move to-
ward the multiplication and elaboration ofroles with greater specializa-
tion of function" [Katz and Kahn 1976, p. 99]. David Hunter and
Phillip Whitten explain a similar evolution with regard to the economy.
"In the economic sphere, a traditional society displays relatively little
division oflabor, but modern societies produce a proliferation ofhighly
differentiated and specialized occupational statuses and roles" [Hunter
and Whitten 1976, p. 287]. Differentiation becomes an important char-
acteristic when discussing ecological restoration. It is important to
think about future differentiation potential when considering option
values of an ecosystem.
The CV and TC methods, consistent with their neoclassical base, do
not deal with system differentiation and elaboration.
Real Time
The time concept most consistent with GSA is system real time,
which is inconsistent with classical ideas about time. According to the
classical Kantian system, for example,
there are the so-called forms of intuition, space and time, and the categor-
ies of the intellect, such as substance, causality and others which are uni-
versally committed for any rational being. Accordingly science based
upon these categories, is equally universal. ... Newtonian time and strict
deterministic causality, is essentially classical mechanics which, therefore,
is the absolute system of knowledge, applying to any phenomenon as well
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as to any mind as observer. It is a well-known fact that modem science
has long recognized that this is not so [Von Bertalanffy 1969, p. 226].
Modern science applies the time concept most appropriate for the
subject under investigation. "The biologist finds that there is no ab-
solute space or time but that they depend on the organization of the
perceiving organism" [Von Bertalanffy 1969, p. 229]. A similar idea is
found in the concept of experienced time. "Experienced time is not
Newtonian. Far from flowing uniformly ... it depends on physiological
conditions" [Von Berta1anffy 1969, p. 236].
Time is not a natural phenomenon; rather, it is a societal construct.
The construct should be consistent with the GSA view and counter to
the reductionist view. Time, if it is to be a useful tool in, for example,
ecological restoration, should be what usually is connoted by the word
timeliness. Timeliness requires that we ask the question: which restora-
tion project will sequence and deliver the right amount of system com-
ponents and elements at the right points in the ecosystem and
sociotechnical system to allow for integration, maintenance, and resto-
ration? "Temporal evaluation that judges whether a project correctly
sequences the delivery of impacts with system needs is consistent with
the basic concepts of computer science real time. Real time systems
relate to the sequential events in a system, rather than to clock or cal-
endar time. The system itself defines when events should happen"
[Hayden 1988, p. 346].
Real time is not used in CVM and TCM studies.
Evaluation and Valuation
Methodologies should be evaluated for their contributions to the so-
lution of the overall problem, to embrace the subtleties of the value of
wildlife, to apply a broad definition of ecosystems, and to provide in-
formation regarding the value of habitats to take full account of regu-
lations and policies on the environment. That approach to ecosystem
evaluation and valuation is consistent with the GSA context. As A.D.
Hall and R.E. Fagen have stated, "analysis, evaluation and synthesis
of systems is not concerned primarily with the pieces ... but with the
concept of system as a whole; its internal relations, and its behavior in
the given environment" [Hall and Fagen 1968, p. 92]. The focus ofeval-
uating and valuing is to identify the value ofthe various entities as they
contribute toward making the socioecology viable. (See Mattessich
[1978] and Laszlo [1972]). Viability includes the idea that there be re-
dundancy in the system network and deliveries to maintain system
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sufficiency. Valuation assists in making decisions about the mainte-
nance, coordination, and restoration of systems through the coordina-
tion and sequencing of relevant events.
The market approaches, CVM and TCM, as stated above, are
concerned with evaluating prices separate from the system. This is in-
consistent with GSA evaluation of the various entities as they contri-
bute toward making the socioecology viable. The measurement of
people's contingent market value of the environment implies that na-
ture's only purpose is for the enjoyment of human beings. When an
attempt is made to apply market demand functions for non-market
goods, this implies that the environment has value only for humans.
These valuation techniques ignore that ecosystems, or particular flora
and fauna, have functions other than human demand for them. Thus,
the CV and TC techniques are inappropriate for establishing a systems
evaluation or cardianl ranking of nonmarket goods.
The CVM treats individuals as the abstract Economic Man explained
by Majumdar.
The Economic Man is truly the knight of popular mythology. His is the
solitary figure of the Subject facing the Object, which is the rest of the
universe. In this Subject-Object relationship the Economic Man has no
collaborator and no human opponent. ... What requires further empha-
sizing is that his motives are constructed to be purely monetary. From
which two attributes of the Economic Man clearly stand out. In the first
place, he is unaffected by (and incapable of affecting) what happened to
others. In the second place, he would not pursue a target which could not
directly or indirectly be brought into relationship with the measuring rod
of money [Majumdar 1975, p. 3].
This definition of economic man is classical economic man rather
than neoclassical person. The first point is that the way CVM is oper-
ationalized, neoclassical person is forced into the mold of the classical
subject-object (respondent-questionnaire) economic man. The second
point is that it is not necessary to take either the classical or neoclassical
utility approach to valuation. "In fact, a dominant section of contem-
porary political and social philosophy appears to be built specifically
upon its denial" [Majumdar 1975, p. xiii].
Conclusion
Although the CVM and TCM are used extensively for measuring the
value ofecosystems, neither method can be legitimized in a theoretical
or applicable sense from a neoclassical, psychometric or general sys-
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terns point of view. The CV and TC approaches lack methodological,
theoretical and empirical grounding. Their continued use will mislead
valuation attempts and frustrate policy intended to restore a viable en-
vironment.
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